American Muslims: "Will We Ever Belong?"

At its best, nationalism unifies people and encourages them to build vibrant cultural, political, and economic traditions. At its worst, nationalism is exclusive. It creates insiders and outsiders, fueling violence, hatred, and worse. Or, at least, that is a dichotomy that apologists for nationalism often draw.

The current environment in America is nothing if not exclusive. Opinion polls show a growing distrust of Islam and events certainly reflect a growing threat of violence against Muslims. A small church in Florida plans to burn the Koran to mark the anniversary of 9/11—a plan that sparked international condemnation because the Koran is, for Muslims, literally the word of God. It is sacred. A Muslim cab driver in New York was recently stabbed. Right wing politicians such as Newt Gingrich and Sarah Palin seem anxious to add their voices to the debate, roundly condemning what they view as extremism in the Islamic community. Whereas the overwhelming majority of American Muslims view themselves very much as Americans with a long and proud history in the United States, they increasingly find themselves defined as outsiders.

In a New York Times feature story, Dr. Ferhan Asghar, an orthopedic spine surgeon in Cincinnati commented “We worry: Will we ever be really completely accepted in American society? In no other country could we have such freedoms — that’s why so many Muslims choose to make this country their own. But we do wonder whether it will get to the point where people don’t want Muslims here anymore.”

In the same story, Eboo Patel, founder and director of Interfaith Youth Core, a Chicago-based community service program that endeavors to reduce religious conflict, said "I am more scared than I've ever been—more scared than I was after Sept. 11."

None of this is entirely new. Edward Curtis, an historian at Indiana University-Purdue University and author of Muslims in America: A Short History, told National Public Radio that at least some Americans have feared Islam since the colonial period (when the first Muslims arrived in the Americas). "Cotton Mather thought that Muslims were a sign of a Christian schism," the author said. "That kind of misunderstanding or negative view of Islam has been with us always. It's kind of come and gone in cycles."

Yet the current anti-Islam backlash is different, if only because there is now a significant Muslim population in the United States. Curtis added "I would say that until there was a significant population of Muslims here ... that kind of prejudice didn't lead into discrimination and hate crimes until really pretty recently."

Many commentators now point out that the anti-Muslim rhetoric has a striking resemblance to "what German media was saying about Jews in the 1920s and 1930s." [The Nazi-link is now made willy-nilly by anybody seeking a short-hand for "evil," but recent events do seem to resemble many instances when a majority community sought to exclude a minority.]

In recent days, a group of concerned Muslims decided to respond with an educational campaign, My Faith, My Voice, a series of web ads that challenge the more xenophobic ideas being voiced.

The entire debate raises an interesting question about nationalism: is it possible to have an inclusive nationalism or does nationalism necessarily have a disturbing and hateful underbelly?

I often cite Michael Billig's excellent distinction between nationalisms, noting that nationalism is most often banal. During such periods, nationalism can be inclusive. Yet in moments of crisis, which themselves might be as pedestrian as a sporting match, hot nationalism emerges with its often xenophobic fears.

For many Americans, this certainly feels like a period of crisis. Unemployment is high, many politicians seem anxious to raise the temperature of debate for their own ends, and the war in Afghanistan drags on. As a result, America's usually banal nationalism turned hot. The proposed Muslim cultural center near ground zero, still raw memories of the terrorist attacks, the on-going war against the Taliban, and a total unwillingness on the part of all too many public figures to clearly distinguish between Islamic (religious ideas premised on a desire for peace dating from the seventh century) and Islamist thought (an extremist and xenophobic political ideology dating from the twentieth century) made Muslims the logical target. Just as there was little effort by Charlemagne's regime to understand the "Saracens" battled in the medieval poem Song of Roland, so now many American nationalists strike out at a convenient "other."

Is it possible for humans to remain inclusive in a crisis or is the desire to assign blame simply too strong? Can educational campaigns reverse the slide toward fear?

SNP Changes Plans on Independence Vote

The Scottish National Party (SNP) has abandoned its pledge, first made three and a half years ago, to hold a referendum on Scottish independence later this year. According to the party, the move is necessary in order to "appeal over the heads" of Labour, Liberal Democrat, and Tory leaders who are expected to vote down any move to hold a plebiscite.

An SNP spokesmen told The Scotsmen: "Tactically, we are deciding whether to introduce a bill to allow the unionist parties to vote it down or rather to publish the bill and concentrate on canvassing public support.

"A new, re-elected SNP government will be in a powerful position to secure passage of the referendum, having successfully mobilised the people over the blocking tactics of the unionist parties."

Opposition parties responded with "derision" and attacked the SNP for "squandering" larger amounts of money on the abandoned vote policy.

The most recent polls show the SNP some 10-points behind Labour in Scotland.

ETA Announces Ceasefire

ETA, the Basque separatist organization, announced another ceasefire yesterday raising hopes of a renewed peace process.

The group previously declared a ceasefire in 2006, only to launch a bomb attack in Madrid nine months later. The attack killed two Ecuadorian immigrants. In total, more than 800 people have died during ETA's 50-year campaign to attain Basque independence from Spain.

Suicide Bombing in Moscow

The Irish Independent reports that two female suicide bombers blew themselves up in a crowded Moscow subway this morning (29 Mar. 2010), killing at least 37 people and wounding at least 102 others.

The bombers are reportedly rebels from Chechnya, a breakaway Russian republic that started to fight for independence from Russia during the mid-1990s. The conflict began with a war that lasted from 1994-96—a conflict that Russia effectively lost following the death of some 70-80,000 people in the devastated city of Grozny.

The stateless-nation soon fell into chaos. Warlords took charge, unemployed Chechens were radicalized, and an assortment of groups, including Islamist militants, moved into the region.

This latest attack offers a reminder to those outside of Russia concerning the festering problems in the former republic. Nationalist struggles may have significant long-term effects that extend beyond the more localized fight for self-determination. It is worth learning a great deal more about the country and its terrible problems:

A Timeline of Key Events in Chechnya, 1830-2006
The Global Issues Website Chechnya page
The US Holocaust Museum's "Preventing Genocide" page
YouTube offers footage of the 1994-96 war
BBC News provides a useful information page on their website

Greek Debt Crisis and the EU

American Public Media's "Marketplace" program ran an interesting story on the Greek debt crisis.

In an effort to prevent his country from defaulting on its debt, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou proposed a $6.5 billion austerity budget this week. Protests resulted. Workers, not anxious to see their pay or benefits cut, were enraged.

Some saw the problem as a European one. Liana Kanelli, a Communist member of the Greek parliament, blames the decision to join the Eurozone in 2001. "If you get in this Eurozone you abolish a very severe amount of your national sovereignty. So you see, we are not free!"

While Kanelli expresses a minority view, the Euro always threatened to undermine national identity. Simply put, money is one of the key ways that nation-states express themselves, putting national symbols on currency as a means of promoting identity. In this case, the compromise was to assure that each country released its own Euros, with nationally distinct symbols on one side of the currency.

Fair enough, but this did not stop a relatively widespread nationalist backlash. What strikes me, however, is that opposition to the EU comes from both left and right. So, the question is this. Will the current economic crisis promote growing resentment toward Germany (the dominant economic power in Europe) and toward the European Union?

The indications from Greece suggest that the answer is "yes." The Marketplace story finishes with the fact that "Greece has now broken the unspoken rule of European politics: don't mention the war. Over the past week or so the Greek airwaves have been awash with archive newsreel footage of German's least popular export. News shows have reminded viewers of Hitler's occupation of Greece."

For Kanelli, German domination of the Eurozone represents "another form of conquest." She states "That's why sometimes I and a lot of other people speak about an economic neo-Nazism that's going against European people."

Memory, nationalism, and economic turmoil always make interesting bedfellows. The Greek story is certainly one worth watching.

More on the US Vote Regarding Armenian Genocide

The non-binding vote by the US Congress regarding the Armenian genocide sparked rage among Turkish nationalists. The Guardian has more...

Legacies of Trauma and National Identity in Modern Turkey

René Dumont remembered the twentieth century “as a century of massacres and wars.” Isaiah Berlin recalled it “only as the most terrible century in Western history.” William Golding echoed these men by saying: “I can’t help thinking that this has been the most violent century in human history.”

If one considers the statistics, these reflections seem apt. Some 37 million casualties during World War I. Between 50 and 60 million dead during World War II—the largest human undertaking in history. Genocides in Armenia, Rwanda, Bosnia. Millions and millions dead in purges in Russia and China. The Vietnam and Korean wars. Horrendous killings in Argentina. The list goes on and on and on.

Given these terrible realities, it is hardly shocking that there are numerous legacies of trauma. In Germany, collective guilt is virtually a cornerstone of post-World War II national identity. In Austria, collaboration with the Nazis was carefully “forgotten” until the 1980s and 90s. In France, the need to forget more shameful chapters of the Second World War created what historian Henry Rousso called the “Vichy Syndrome.” Indeed, the first serious historical study of Vichy, written by Robert Paxton in 1972, resulted in hate mail and death threats. In Russia and China, unpleasant memories of mass death and all pervasive fear are submerged in nostalgic recollections of a previous age.

Against the great canvas of the twentieth century, the Turkish effort to forget the massacre of roughly 1.5 million Armenians between 1915 and 1923 is hardly unique. During those years, the Ottoman government force-marched Armenians from their homes to horrendous camps, never supplying adequate water or food. [You can see a map of the various genocide-related sites by clicking here.] The experience represents the first genocide of the twentieth century, an ominous marker of what was to come.

The effort to separate modern Turkish identity from the Ottoman past started with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk disdained the Ottomans. Historian Christopher S. Wilson, a professor at Izmir University of Economics in Turkey, quotes Atatürk saying: “The new Turkey has no relationship to the old one. The Ottoman government has disappeared into history. A new Turkey has now been born.” Wilson goes on to say that the new leadership

frequently described their Ottoman predecessor as old, outdated, inefficient, wasteful and disorganized. In contrast, their new democracy was to be modern, up-to-date, efficient, resourceful and well organized. This attitude of contempt for the new state’s immediate predecessor shaped the ideology and hence policies of the young Republic of Turkey.

Toward this end, the Turks did everything in their power to move on, right down to endeavoring to represent the new state through different architecture, symbols, and myths. Useful, pre-Ottoman sources were emphasized to give legitimacy to the new regime, while whatever came after was conveniently forgotten. There was certainly nothing helpful about remembering a mass murder.

Given the foundation story of the Turkish state, it is hardly surprising that efforts by the European Union and now the United States to demand a confession of the sins of the past is not greeted warmly by the Turks.

Turkish objections are so vehement that the country faces exclusion from the European Union and the passage of a non-binding Congressional resolution by the US Congress is raising fears that US-Turkish relations may be damaged at a time when the American government is dependant on Turkish good will in order to carry out its foreign policy in places such as Afghanistan.

Understanding the nexus of legacies of trauma, contemporary politics, and national identity, even in places that may seem as peripheral to many Americans as Armenia, is tremendously important. While it seems utopian to imagine, along with Armenian foreign minister Edward Nalbandian, that resolutions such as the one passed yesterday represent “an important step towards the prevention of crimes against humanity”—the endless repetition of “never again” in reference to the Shoah certainly has not stopped mass killing from taking place—the ongoing working out of memory does seem important. Especially if that memory work inspires a greater understanding of twenty-first century identities.

Work Cited:

Christopher S. Wilson, “The Persistence of the Turkish Nation in the Mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,” in Mitchell Young, Eric Zuelow, and Andreas Sturm (eds), Nationalism in a Global Era: The Persistence of Nations (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 93-114.